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Abstract 
We revisit Western Europe’s record with labor-productivity convergence, and tentatively extrapolate 
its implications for the future path of Eastern Europe. The poorer Western European countries caught 
up with the richer ones through both higher rates of physical capital accumulation and greater total 
factor productivity gains. These (relatively) high rates of capital accumulation and TFP growth reflect 
convergence along two margins. One margin (between industry) is a massive reallocation of labor 
from agriculture to manufacturing and services, which have higher capital intensity and use resources 
more efficiently. The other margin (within industry) reflects capital deepening and technology catch-
up at the industry level. In Eastern Europe the employment share of agriculture is typically quite 
large, and agriculture is particularly unproductive. Hence, there are potential gains from sectoral 
reallocation. However, quantitatively the between-industry component of the East’s income gap is 
quite small. Hence, the East seems to have only one real margin to exploit: the within industry one. 
Coupled with the fact that within-industry productivity gaps are enormous, this suggests that 
convergence will take a long time. On the positive side, however, Eastern Europe already has levels of 
human capital similar to those of Western Europe. This is good news because human capital gaps 
have proved very persistent in Western Europe’s experience. Hence, Eastern Europe does start out 
without the handicap that is harder to overcome.   
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1 Introduction
Western Europe is the quintessential convergence club. In 1950 real labor productivity in
some of its richest countries was more than 3 times higher than in some of its poorest. By the
end of the century, all Western European labor-productivity ratios were well below 2. One
aspect of this decline in cross-country European inequality is of course the catch-up by the
Southerners: Italy first, then Spain, Greece, Portugal, and eventually Ireland (a Southerner
in spirit) all had their spurts of above-average productivity growth. Spain’s experience is
emblematic and inspiring: in less than 15 years between the late 50s and the early 70s its
labor productivity relative to France (our benchmark for the “average” European experience)
went from roughly 65 percent to over 90 percent.
On May 1st 2004 the club admitted 10 new members, primarily from Eastern Europe.
To varying degrees, the Easterners’ current relative labor productivities are similar to the
relative labor productivities of the Southerners before their convergence spurts. For example,
Hungary today is almost exactly as productive relative to France as Greece was in 1950, while
Poland is roughly as productive — always relative to France — as Portugal was then. This
widely noted analogy has naturally given rise to hopes that the Easterners will be the new
Southerners, Poland the new Spain. Indeed, this hope is one of the very reasons why these
countries have wanted to join (and several others hope to join) the club.
Given that so many people are pinning so many hopes on the continued ability of the
European club to generate convergence among its members, this seems a useful time to re-
visit the data on the relative growth performance of European countries in the second-half of
the 20th century. Our main aim is to look behind the aggregate labor productivity numbers
and present a couple of diﬀerent approaches to “decompose” the overall convergence experi-
ence into more disaggregated processes. We make no claim of methodological or conceptual
innovation: our goal is to organize all the data “under one roof,” and take stock.
We organize the discussion around four potential views or hypotheses explaining the
convergence process. The first view is grounded in the Solovian-neoclassical hypothesis, ac-
cording to which initially capital-poor countries have higher marginal productivity of capital,
and hence faster growth. The second hypothesis, motivated in part by endogenous growth
models, explains the convergence process as the result of technological catch-up. Initially-
backward countries converge to the technological leaders mainly through a process of imi-
tation (which is presumably cheaper than innovation). The third hypothesis interprets the
convergence process as mainly driven by gains from trade from European integration, which
may have been disproportionately larger for the poor economies (as a proportion of GDP)
both because of their initially more autarchic status, and because of their relatively smaller
size. The fourth and final hypothesis views the convergence process as a by product of the
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structural transformation, which is partially a process of reallocation of resources from low-
productivity to high-productivity sectors. If initially poorer countries had a longer way to go
in this transformation, this process may itself have been a source of convergence.
With respect to the relative contributions of capital deepening and technical change
to the reduction of European inequality we find that physical capital accumulation and total
factor productivity (TFP) growth were roughly equally important. However, somewhat sur-
prisingly, we also find virtually no role for human capital accumulation: diﬀerences in human
capital per worker — at least as measured by years of schooling — are both substantial and
persistent. Another somewhat surprising result is that TFP was not always initially lower
in poor countries, a fact that is hard to reconcile with catch-up theories of technological
diﬀusion.
As an explanation for regional convergence the trade view runs into some problems.
For example, countries with a comparative disadvantage (or no advantage) in agriculture
show invariably larger shares of agriculture, while countries with a comparative advantage
in agriculture tend to show systematically lower shares. The structural-transformation ap-
proach fares better. For example we find that the Southerners converged to the rest mainly
through a faster rate of reallocation of the labor force from low-productivity agriculture
into high-productivity manufacturing and services. However, in other cases within-industry
productivity catch-up was also quite important.
When we turn our attention to thirteen (mostly) Eastern European countries that
have either recently joined the EU, or are in line to join, we tend to find very large labor
productivity gaps vis-a`-vis Western Europe. In accounting for these gaps, we find substantial
roles for physical capital and TFP gaps, but no role whatsoever for human capital gaps. This
is in a sense good news for the Easterners, because the Western European experience suggests
that human capital gaps are the hardest to bridge.
Like Portugal, Spain, Italy, and Greece fifty years ago, the new and forthcoming EU
members exhibit substantially larger shares of workers employed in agriculture, which tends
to be the least productive sector. Manufacturing and services are also less productive in the
East than in Western Europe, though the gaps are not as large as in agriculture. There
is therefore some scope for large productivity gains through both labor reallocation out of
agriculture and within-industry catch-up. However, quantitatively, in Eastern Europe the
distribution of employment among sectors is much less important as a source of income gaps
vis-a-vis the rest of Europe than it was in Southern Europe in 1960. Hence, in a way, the
Easterners have only one margin to exploit in their quest for convergence — within-industry
productivity gap. In contrast, the South was able to also exploit the between-industry margin.
There are of course several other authors who have looked at Western European con-
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vergence from various angles. Some examples are Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1991), Quah
(1996), and Boldrin and Canova (2001). There are also several excellent studies of individ-
ual countries’ convergence experiences, such as Honohan and Walsh (2002), and Oltheten,
Pinteris, and Sougiannis (2003). Finally, the idea of using the experience of other coun-
tries/regions to speculate on the convergence prospects of Eastern Europe is also not new:
see, among others, Fisher, Sahay, and Vegh (1998a, 1998b), and Boldrin and Canova (2003).
Our contribution, however, looks at the data from a diﬀerent perspective, and is thus com-
plementary to the existing ones.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follow. In Section 2, we review the
European experience with labor-productivity convergence in the second half of the 20th
century. In Section 3 we discuss various possible views one can advance to explain the
convergence process. In Sections 4 and 5 we take a look at more disaggregated data to try
to shed light on the explanatory power of the various approaches. In Section 6 we introduce
the Easterners, and compare their characteristics with those of the Southerners before their
catch up. We summarize and conclude in Section 7.
2 European Convergence 1950-2000
The point of this section is to refresh everybody’s memory on the basic fact of European
convergence. This is done in Figure 2.1, where we plot, for each of 14 Western European
countries, per worker GDP (in PPP) relative to France. We choose France as a benchmark
because its growth experience between 1950 and 2000 is virtually identical to that of the aver-
age European country. In fact, the ratio of per worker GDP (in PPP) of France relative to the
European (population-weighted) average is practically 1 throughout the whole period. The
14 countries are the other members of the European Union (pre-May 1st), less Luxembourg
plus Norway.1 The data for figure 2.1 come straight from the Penn World Table, Version 6.1
(PWT), and measure Gross Domestic Product per worker [it’s the variable GDPWOK. See
Heston, Summers, and Aten (2002)].2
In order to highlight the convergence outcomes we draw horizontal lines in each graph
through 0.9 and 1.1. Note that thirteen of the fourteen countries start out outside this range,
and ten out of fourteen end up inside (or right at the threshold). Furthermore, in three of the
four cases in which relative GDP is still outside our “convergence band” the distance from the
band has nevertheless declined considerably. The overall reduction in inequality is dramatic.
1Hence, other than city states, we are only missing Iceland and Switzerland, for whom there were too many
gaps in some of the data we use later in the paper.
2For Germany we actually use the series on Western Germany from Version 5.6 of PWT up to 1990, and
the series on Germany from Version 6.1 thereafter.
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To cap it all, the only case in which the absolute distance from France has increased rather
than fallen is not so much a case of failed convergence but one of, so to speak, “excessive
convergence”: Ireland started out poor, converged from below, and then it forgot to stop
— ending up the most productive in Europe. It is now well above the upper bound of the
convergence band.
The geographical patterns are also well known but none the less striking. Note that
the country graphs are arranged in increasing order of (their capital’s) latitude. The South-
erners (Greece, Portugal, Spain, Italy, and Austria) all start out poorer and experience various
degrees of catching up. Spain, Italy, and Austria fully make it; Greece has virtually made it
by 1975, but it then slips and loses some (but by no means all) of the gains between 1975
and 1995; Portugal’s progress is slower, but it seems on track to reach the lower edge of the
band in the not-too-distant future. Then there are most of the “Northerners” (Belgium, the
UK, the Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden, and Norway), that start out richer than France and
converge “from above” to within 90 percent and 110 percent of France’s labor productivity -
with the minor exception of Belgium that ends up slightly above the upper boundary. Ger-
many is the geographical and economic “In-betweener,” starting and ending within the 90-110
band. The only two serious deviations from the geographical-economic pattern are Finland,
that converges from below instead of from above, like the other high-latitude countries; and
Ireland, which is exceptional both because it converges from below instead of from above,
and because — as we have already seen — it fails to stop after converging.
Of course, convergence from above by the Northerners really means that France
caught up with them. Hence, what Figure 2.1 really tells us is that there has been a general-
ized catching up of from South to North, or that the growth rate has been, on average, fairly
smoothly decreasing with latitude.
As mentioned in the Introduction, the rest of the paper explores a couple of ways of
peering into the black box of the convergence processes depicted in Figure 2.1, in the hope
of shedding some light on some of its mechanics.
Before proceeding, we quickly dispose of a secondary issue having to do with formal
membership into the EU. Figure 2.1 is identical to Figure 2.1, except that it adds a vertical
line for the date in which each country joined the European Community. Visual inspection
suggests that it is extremely hard to argue for an important role for formal EC (later, EU)
membership per se in facilitating convergence. Italy, Spain, Greece, and Austria all had
their convergence spurts before formally joining European institutions, and the Northerners
lost ground whether or not they were in the EC/EU. One can squint at the behavior of the
relative income series around the dates of accession, but no systematic “kink” up or down
seems to be associated with that date. What seems to matter for convergence is not so
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much formal membership into European institutions, but rather — if anything — participation
in a generalized trend towards greater economic integration at the European level. This
integration would probably have occurred with or without the EC.3
3 Four ways to converge
Depending on one’s background and tastes, there are at least four possible reactions to the
graphs in Figure 2.1, and to the convergence processes they describe. In this section we briefly
outline these four possible responses, and in the rest of the paper we query the available data
for the corresponding supporting evidence. We stress at the outset that the four views are
not mutually exclusive.
1) Solovian convergence. If you are steeped in neoclassical growth theory [Ramsey
(1928), Solow (1956), and subsequent developments] you will be strongly tempted to interpret
Figure 2.1 in terms of capital deepening. The idea, of course, is that initially capital-poor
countries have higher marginal productivities of capital. This leads them to grow faster
than initially capital-rich countries. This argument still works if you take a broader view of
capital, to include human capital [Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992)]. It is also independent
of whether one thinks the capital is generated by domestic savings or flows in from abroad —
though that may aﬀect the speed of convergence (Barro, Mankiw, and Sala-i-Martin). This
Solovian interpretation of convergence processes motivates much of the growth-regression
literature of the 1990s [Barro (1991), Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992), and all the rest). It
also finds strong support in growth accounting exercises for East-Asian miracle economies
[Young (1995)].
2) Technological catch-up. If instead you have been captivated by so-called “endogenous-
growth” models [Romer (1990), Grossman and Helpman (1991), Aghion and Howitt (1992)],
you may tend to read in the graphs of Figure 2.1 the eﬀects of technological catch-up by
initially backward countries. In particular, you will have in mind models where imitation
is less costly than innovation, so that countries initially behind the world technology fron-
tier experience faster improvements in technology than the leaders [e.g. Nelson and Phelps
(1966), Krugman (1979), Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1997), Howitt (2000)]. Empirical work
on cross-country TFP growth is generally motivated by this view [e.g. Coe and Helpman
(1995), Coe, Helpman, and Hoﬀmeister (1997)]. Evidence that cross-country income diﬀer-
ences are largely due to diﬀerences in TFP is also consistent with this view [e.g. Klenow and
3Some authors use growth regression techniques to estimate the coeﬃcient of a “EC-dummy.” Results are
mixed. Even if it was more strongly in favor of a positive EC-eﬀect, however, this type of evidence does not
bear directly on the issue of the sources of convergence. A positive coeﬃcient on the EC-membership dummy
means that EC members grow faster than non-EC members, not that they should converge to each other.
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Rodriguez-Clare (1997), Hall and Jones (1999)].
3) Gains from trade. If you are a trade theorist your instinct may be to interpret the
graphs in terms of gains from trade. In particular, suppose (realistically) that initially the
richer European countries were more integrated among each other and with the rest of the
world than the poor ones. Suppose further (and also realistically) that over the second-half
of the century the poorer countries became gradually more integrated with the rest. Then
not only should they have experienced gains from trade but — due to their initially more
autarchic status — their gains from trade should have been larger as a proportion of GDP
than those of the richer economies. Hence the convergence. The fact that poorer countries
tended to be smaller is another reason to expect disproportionate gains by these countries
and ultimately convergence.
It is customary to object to trade-based interpretations of rapid growth that the
theory predicts higher income levels, not higher growth rates. But looking again at Figure
2.1 one cannot reject outright the hypothesis that convergence was the result of one-oﬀ,
discrete jumps in income levels. Consider again the fewer than 15 years it took Spain to
recover from a 25 percent productivity handicap, or the ten years or so it took Greece to
bridge an even larger gap. Furthermore it is actually possible — exploiting the idea of a “ladder
of comparative advantage” — to turn the static gains-from-trade theory into a dynamic one
[Jones (1973), Findlay (1974), Kruger (1977), Ventura (1997)].4
4) Structural transformation. If you are an old-fashioned macro-development econo-
mist, you are used to thinking about the growth process as inextricably linked with structural
transformations: vast reallocations of resources from one industry to another [the early clas-
sics include Clark (1940), Nurske (1953), Lewis (1954), etc. There is more systematic recent
work by Imbs and Wacziarg (2003), and Koren and Tenreyro (2004)]. If resources are re-
allocated from low-productivity to high-productivity sectors, this structural transformation
is itself a source of growth. If Southern countries — as is likely — underwent a more radical
structural transformation than Northern countries during the 1950-2000 period, then it is
also a source of convergence.
This reasoning is best illustrated by recent work on another South-to-North conver-
gence, that of the Southern United States to the rest of the US over the 20th century [Caselli
and Coleman (2001)]. At the beginning of the century the South was overwhelmingly agricul-
tural, while the rest of the US was predominantly specialized in manufacturing and services.
4Not all trade theorists will look at Figure 2.1 with comparative-advantage in mind. Readers of Helpman
and Krugman (1989) may view increased integration as allowing for increasing returns in the presence of
intra-industry trade. We do not attempt to assess this view in the present draft (except for a brief remark
in Footnote 16), but perhaps in the future we can get at this by seeing if there have been particular gains in
labor productivity in sectors experiencing the biggest increases in trade.
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Since agriculture had much lower output per worker, the South also had much lower aggregate
labor productivity. Over the decades, the US-wide cost of migrating from the agricultural
sector to the non-agricultural ones declined sharply, mainly as a result of improved access
to schooling for rural children. In turn, the lower cost of migration to the more productive
sector led to overall aggregate productivity gains. However, these productivity gains were
disproportionately concentrated in the South, which had the largest share of workers initially
trapped in agriculture. Perhaps the Southern Europeans also had their labor force initially
disproportionately concentrated in low-productivity industries?
We should stress that the mapping between the accounting exercise that follows and
the four convergence hypotheses we study is not perfect. The accounting analysis is aimed at
providing a guidance as to the main forces behind convergence and hence the results should
be taken as suggestive indications rather than conclusive verdicts.
4 Solovian Convergence and Technological Catch-Up
In this section we tackle the first two of the possible views of convergence we listed in the
previous section: the capital deepening explanation associated with the Solow and other
neoclassical models of growth, and the technology-diﬀusion explanation, which would be
emphasized by endogenous growth theories.
Our approach will be to decompose the convergence series plotted in Figure 2.1 into
three components: convergence in physical capital, convergence in human capital, and conver-
gence in Total Factor Productivity. The sum of the first two may be seen as the contribution
of Solovian convergence, while the third may capture the contribution of technology catch-
up. Plainly, this approach is a hybrid of growth accounting, which decomposes growth rates
into capital growth and TFP growth, and development accounting, which decomposes cross-
country diﬀerences in income levels into capital and TFP. Here, since we decompose relative
growth rates, we have both the time and the cross-country dimension. Hence, we may term
the exercise we perform convergence accounting.
More specifically, we will use the following familiar-looking expression:
∆ log yRit = α∆ log k
R
it + (1− α)∆ log hRit +∆ logARit , (1)
where α is the capital share in output, and ∆ is a first-diﬀerence operator. The only slightly
unusual aspect is that output, inputs, and total factor productivity are measured relative to
France. Hence, yRit is aggregate labor productivity in country i relative to aggregate labor
productivity in France, kRit and h
R
it are relative physical and human capital, and A
R
it is relative
TFP.5
5Of course equation (1) can be interpreted as an approximation for the growth rate of relative labor
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Data on yRit is of course the data we plotted in Figure 2.1. For k
R
it and h
R
it we need
to construct time series for each country’s physical and human capital stocks. We construct
physical capital stocks from the PWT series on real investment. Investment data start in
1950. To initialize the capital stock we assume that the growth rate of investment up to 1950
has been the same as the observed growth rate of investment between 1950 and 1955.6 In
order to minimize the bias arising from this arbitrary choice of initial value of the capital
stock we begin our convergence decomposition in 1960. Little is lost by this curtailing of the
time series as most of the important convergence spurts (with the exception of Italy) begin
right around, or after, this date.
To construct data on hRit we mostly use the De La Fuente and Domenech (2002) data
set on average years of schooling in the OECD. However, De La Fuente and Domenech stop in
1990 or 1995, depending on the country. To extend the series to 2000 we use the growth rates
(over the relevant period) of the corresponding series in the Barro and Lee (2001) data set
— in combination with the latest level reported by De La Fuente and Domenech.7 With this
data at hand, we follow the development accounting literature and estimate each country’s
human capital as hit = exp(βsit), where sit is the average years of schooling in the labor force,
and β is the Mincerian rate of return to one extra year of schooling. We set β = 0.10, which
reflects a broad consensus on the average returns to schooling around the world. Finally,
following yet again the development-accounting literature, we set α = 0.33. We report later
on how results change when using country-specific capital shares.8
Before proceeding to the formal results, we spend a minute looking at the time series
in Figure 4.1, where we plot the time paths of kR, hR, and AR for all countries. For phys-
ical capital we see patterns of convergence that broadly resemble those in Figure 2.1: poor
countries started out with lower physical capital levels than France, and accumulated faster
over time, while rich countries started out with more capital, and accumulated more slowly
than France. This is very Solovian. The only exceptions are Italy, which by 1960 already had
productivity when the production function (per worker) is y = Akαh1−α.
6Hence, K1950 = I1950/(g+ δ), where g is the investment growth rate between 1950 and 1955, and δ is the
depreciation rate. Young (1995) follows a similar approach. Following the development-accounting literature
we set δ = 0.06.
7An alternative would have been to use Barro and Lee throughout, but the De La Fuente and Domenench
data are supposed to constitute an improvement over Barro and Lee for this set of countries. In the Appendix
we compare the average years of schooling variable from the two data sets (Figure A.1). It does look like the
Barro and Lee numbers contain some surprising jumps in their series. The country rankings of attainment are
also more consistent with our priors. In footnote 10 we report on the results of the convergence-accounting
exercise when using the Barro and Lee data.
8For a survey of development accounting methods see Caselli (2003). We will not bore the reader with
the obvious list of caveats and disclaimers about the very rough and tentative nature of the exercise we just
described.
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a level of capital intensity very close to France’s (and kept it that way thereafter), and the
UK, which in 1960 had lower capital intensity than France — despite being richer. Relative
human capital in 1960 was also generally lower in poor countries and higher — or about the
same as in France — in rich countries. However, unlike what we see for physical capital,
relative human capital levels are extremely persistent, so that relatively human-capital poor
countries remain that way throughout the period. This is not very “augmented-Solovian”
at all, and it implies that human capital accumulation cannot have contributed to much
aggregate convergence. Two exceptions are perhaps Denmark and Norway, which have lost
some of their human-capital advantage relative to the rest. One objection to the use of
years of schooling as a measure of human capital is, of course, that they do not take into
account the diﬀerences in the quality of education across countries. Caselli (2003) performs
a development accounting exercise using quality-adjusted measures of human capital based
on international tests and schooling inputs (pupil/teacher ratios and education spending)
and finds that these diﬀerences are relatively immaterial. While level-comparisons might be
diﬀerent from growth-comparisons Caselli’s findings are somewhat reassuring.
Initial relative TFP levels were lower in Greece, Portugal, and Austria, but rose after
1960, so technology catch up contributed to these countries’ convergence. In Spain and
Italy, however, TFP was already at the same level as in France, or higher, in 1960. Still,
after that date these two countries continued to outpace France in eﬃciency gains, so that
technological change did contribute to their overall convergence. Basically, these countries
used faster technological change (and Spain also faster capital deepening) to bridge the gap
caused by their persistently lower human capital. For the initially rich countries the expected
pattern of initially higher and subsequently falling relative TFP is observed in the UK, the
Netherlands and Sweden. However, Denmark’s TFP is roughly at France’s level throughout
the period, so that its relative loss is entirely due to slower rates of physical and human
capital accumulation. Norway actually starts out with lower TFP and converges to France
from below, so that France’s convergence to Norway occurs despite technological catch-up
from Norway to France.
The casual observations described before are made more precise in Table 4.1, which
reports the formal results of the decomposition in equation (1). The first panel shows changes
over the entire 1960-2000 period. Formally, this means that the ∆ operator in equation (1) is
the 40-year diﬀerence. The first column reports the value of ∆ log yRit for each country. This
is basically the same information we already reported in Figure 2.1. Hence, for example,
Greece’s productivity relative to France increased by almost one fourth or, roughly equiv-
alently, over this 40 years Greece’s average annual growth rate exceeded France’s by little
more than one-half of a percentage point. The biggest gain of course is posted by Ireland,
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whose productivity grew by 60 percentage points more than France’s, followed by Portugal.
Italy’s gain looks slightly more modest than those of the other Southerners because most of
its convergence spurt took place in the 1950s. The biggest comparative losses were experi-
enced by Sweden and the Netherlands, vis-a`-vis whom France gained about 30 percentage
points of relative income.
The remaining three columns show how relative physical and human capital accumu-
lation, and TFP growth contributed to these changes in relative income. These numbers are
illustrated in Figure 4.2, whose bars show the contribution of the three terms (the sum of
the bars corresponds to the total convergence to France). The clearest indication to emerge
from the table (as from the figure) is that in nearly all cases — despite substantial diﬀerences
in levels, and aside from the already-noted two exceptions — convergence in human capital
played a nearly insignificant role in driving aggregate productivity convergence.
This leaves it to physical capital and total factor productivity to share the role of
proximate sources of convergence. Broadly speaking, in most cases relative TFP growth ap-
pears to have contributed slightly more to convergence than capital deepening, but the orders
of magnitude of the two contributions are very similar.9 In view of the noisy nature of the
data, it seems warranted to conclude that — as a general rule — Western European conver-
gence is attributable in roughly equal parts to faster capital accumulation and technological
improvement by the poorer countries. The only clear exceptions are Italy and Ireland, both
of whom converged overwhelmingly through relative eﬃciency gains, and Denmark, whose
slowdown relative to France we have already noted to be entirely due to slower human and
physical capital accumulation.
In sum, the glass is half full both for neoclassical and endogenous growth theorists:
poorer countries experienced faster physical capital deepening, and this explains about fifty
percent of their relative gains; and they experienced faster TFP growth, accounting for the
remaining fifty percent. But the glass is also half empty for both. Neoclassical growth
theorists may be puzzled by the lack of convergence in human capital. And endogenous
growth theorists may be disoriented by the fact that not all initially poorer countries lagged
the rest technologically, so that their continued faster TFP growth does not square well with
the technology catch up story they would probably favor.
Inspection of Figure 2.1 reveals in many cases what may loosely be termed a “struc-
tural break” around 1975 (that fateful date!). Indeed, 1975 looks like the year of accomplished
convergence for several countries. After that date, relative incomes tend to look much more
stable. In the case of Greece there is actually a convergence reversal around 1975. For these
9This may seem puzzling given the apparent bigger swings of physical capital in Figure 4.1, but recall that
kR in equation (1) gets weighted by 0.33.
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reasons, it seems useful to present additional decomposition results for the 1960-1975 period.
This is done in Table 4.2, which is otherwise an exact replica of Table 4.1. Notable in this ta-
ble is the truly exceptional relative performance of Greece and Spain during this sub-period,
driven in equal parts by physical capital accumulation and TFP growth in the former, and
for about two-fifths by capital and three-fifths by TFP in the latter. For completeness, in
Table 4.3 we also show the convergence decomposition for the 1975-2000 period. Here we see
with dismay the reversal of much of Greece’s gains of the previous sub-period, driven once
again in equal parts by a slowdown in capital accumulation and a technological (relative)
falling back; the solid gains that Portugal keeps posting, again attributable to both physical
capital and TFP growth; and the TFP-driven explosion of Ireland.10
As a robustness check on our conclusions we repeated the capital-TFP convergence
decomposition using country specific capital shares instead of the common value of 0.33.
Country-specific capital shares have recently been estimated by Gollin (2002), and by Bernanke
and Gurkaynak (2001). Using figures from the latter paper, we found our main conclusion
— that human-capital convergence played very little role in cross-country productivity con-
vergence — to be very robust. More specifically, the numbers for the contribution of human
capital to convergence change very little. However, for some countries the relative contribu-
tions of physical capital accumulation and technology catch up do change. In particular, for
Greece 1960-2000 convergence becomes overwhelmingly a matter of TFP convergence, while
for Spain most of the action becomes concentrated on physical capital. Most of France’s catch
up to the Netherlands becomes technological, while its physical-capital catch up to Denmark
and Norway becomes more pronounced (so that, correspondingly, these countries no longer
vastly outpace it in TFP growth). The detailed results using country specific capital shares
are presented in Tables 4.4-4.7.
5 Trade and Structural Transformation
In this section we turn to interpretations (3) and (4) of the European convergence experience.
According to explanation (3) gains from trade following European economic integration dis-
10There are some important diﬀerences in results when using the Barro and Lee (2001) data on years of
schooling, instead of those of Domenech and De La Fuente (2002). In particular, convergence in human capital
becomes an important source of overall convergence for Greece and Spain. In the former, convergence in human
capital almost entirely displaces convergence in TFP as a source of overall convergence, while in the latter it
grabs half of TFP’s contribution (of course the contribution of physical capital is insensitive to measurement
of human capital). There are also several changes in the results for the Northerners. In particular, according
to the Barro and Lee data the Netherlands, Sweden, and Norway greatly outpace France in human capital
accumulation, so that their convergence from above takes place despite strong divergence in human capital.
Also, Finland convergence from below becomes primarily a matter of human capital accumulation.
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proportionately benefited the (initially less integrated) poor economies. Explanation (4) is
that the initially poorer countries had the productive structure most distorted towards low
productivity sectors, and that they therefore benefited proportionately the most from the
gradual removal of barriers to inter-sectoral mobility.
It is easy to see why these two views can be assessed jointly: they have broadly
opposite predictions on the patterns of structural change we should see across countries.
In particular, by emphasizing specialization according to comparative advantage, the tradi-
tional trade view implies that productivity convergence should be associated with structural
divergence. On the other hand, by envisioning a world in which all countries gradually shift
resources to the greatest value-added sectors, the structural-transformation view predicts that
productivity convergence should be accompanied by convergence in industrial composition
as well.
In order to investigate these two convergence hypotheses we have put together a data
set on the evolution of the industrial composition of output and employment in our 15 coun-
tries. Specifically, we have data on the value added and number of workers employed in the
following 6 sectors: (1) agriculture, hunting and fishing (henceforth agriculture); (2) manu-
facturing, mining, and quarrying (henceforth manufacturing); (3) utilities; (4) construction;
(5) transportation; and (6) everything else (henceforth, services). We would of course have
preferred to work with more finely disaggregated data but this is the best we have been able
to do. We observe these data at five-year intervals, starting for most countries in 1955 (but
in some cases in 1950, and in some others in 1960). We have assembled these data through
a laborious process of parsing from many diﬀerent sources, both international and national.
We give details in the appendix.11
We begin the exploration of these data by looking at a series of graphs. Figure 5.1
shows for each country the evolution of the employment shares of agriculture, manufactur-
ing, and services over time. (The other three industries together invariably account for a
very small proportion of overall employment). The textbook pattern of declining employ-
ment share of agriculture, increasing employment share of services, and inverted-U shaped
employment share of manufacturing is clearly visible in the graphs for most countries.12 This
is little more than a check on the basic reasonableness of our data. Still, it is useful to be
reminded of the sheer magnitude of the diﬀerences in industrial composition among Western
European countries in the 50s. For example, all of the Southerners have employment shares
of agriculture between 40 and 60 percent (roughly the level of the US in 1880), while the
Northerners have agricultural shares well below 30 percent — and in many cases well below
11Given the paucity of organized information on this subject, especially for the early (and more interesting)
period, the creation of this data set may well be the most important contribution of the present paper.
12See Ngai and Pissarides (2004) for a recent model that matches these empirical regularities.
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10 percent. Fittingly, our “middle-of-the-road” benchmark, France, is in between, with 35
percent. For completeness, Figure 5.2 shows the shares of the three “small” sectors. They
jointly account, on average, for less than 15 percent of total employment.
That all of the club members have been steadily moving out of agriculture and (even-
tually) into services is neither surprising nor conclusive for which interpretation of European
convergence has more explanatory power. The more important question is whether the vari-
ous countries are converging towards similar industrial structures — as predicted by a theory
in which all countries shift resources towards the highest value added sectors — or towards
permanently diﬀerent ones — as would be more consistent with a comparative-advantage ex-
planation for convergence. To try to get a handle on this question we plot in Figure 5.3
the sectoral employment shares in Figure 5.1 minus the corresponding shares in France. We
also plot a horizontal line at 0 to better gauge whether the general movement is towards
convergence in employment shares or not.13
The data show a general tendency towards structural convergence. The Southerners,
together with Ireland and Finland, all of which start out with higher-than-average agricultural
labor shares, experience a substantial decline in these shares relative to France. Greece,
Portugal, and Austria, though, have not yet closed the gap. The Northerners, in contrast,
experience a significant increase in the agricultural shares relative to France. Manufacturing
shares also show remarkable convergence, with some overshooting in the cases of Portugal,
Ireland, and Italy. The share of labor in Services converges quickly for the Northerners, but
less so for the Southerners.
Obviously, if we had all the sectors in the economy, the sum of all the lines should
be zero. The persisting diﬀerences between the services shares in Greece and Austria and
the services share in France are the mirror image of the persisting diﬀerences between the
corresponding agricultural shares. For Italy the services gap is made up by a symmetric
gap in manufacturing. For Portugal, Ireland, and Finland, the services diﬀerence is partly
compensated by the overshooting in manufacturing, partly by a persistent gap in agricultural
shares, and partly by an increase in these countries’ shares of construction relative to France’s,
which is shown in Figure 5.4, together with the shares of the remaining (small) sectors relative
to the corresponding ones in France.
In sum, at least judging by the coarse evidence of Figure 5.3, the conclusion seems to
be that Western European countries did grow closer in industrial structure over the second
half of the 20th century — as in the “structural-transformation” view of convergence — but
there remain some potentially permanent diﬀerences in industrial composition — as in the
13The analytics in the next sub-section justify using employment share diﬀerences instead of employment
share ratios.
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“comparative advantage” view.
Another way to think about trade is to look at the relative labor productivities in
the various sectors. In particular, under a comparative-advantage interpretation we would
expect non-convergence to occur in those sectors in which labor productivity relative to the
“average country” is relatively higher. For this reason, and also because it is interesting in
and of itself, we plot in Figure 5.5 each sector’s output per worker as a ratio of France’s
output per worker in the same sector. (We continue to choose France as a plausible stand in
for the average country).
There are two lessons we draw from these graphs. First, over time there has been
significant convergence in the labor productivities of the various sectors towards French sec-
toral labor productivity levels. We will return to this important within-industry productivity
convergence process shortly. Second, and more directly relevant to the discussion at hand,
it actually does not look like the remaining diﬀerences in industrial structure that seem to
emerge from Figure 5.3 are dictated by comparative advantage. For example, looking at
recent years, Italy seems to have a comparative advantage in services, and a comparative
disadvantage in manufacturing. Yet, as we have seen, its pattern of specialization has tilted
towards manufacturing. Greece, which specializes in agriculture, has a comparative advan-
tage in everything but.14,15 An alternative way to look at this is through the plot of diﬀerences
in sectoral shares with France against relative productivity.
Clearly, this reading of the data relies on all sectors being tradable. One may object,
however, that very likely services are less tradable than both manufacturing and agriculture.
Restricting the analysis to these two sectors, Greece does not exhibit any clear pattern of
comparative advantage vis-a`-vis France. Austria and Portugal seem to have a comparative
advantage in manufacturing. But then it is certainly diﬃcult for the comparative-advantage
view to explain why Greece, Austria, and Portugal have larger shares of agriculture relative
to those in France. Ignoring services, Italy and Spain exhibit a comparative advantage in
agriculture with respect to France until 1970, when the comparative advantage shifts in favor
of manufacturing. A similar pattern emerges for Ireland, although the shift occurs more than
two decades later. Throughout most of the period, and again at odds with the comparative-
advantage view, the shares of agriculture in Spain, Italy, and Ireland, although declining,
14Comparative advantage should be judged against all trading partners and not only France. So, for
example, if other trading partners had significantly higher productivity in all sectors relative to agriculture
when compared to Greece, we could rationalize the fact that Greece specializes in agriculture. However,
looking at the figures we see that this criterion would imply that all other EU members (except for Austria,
Germany, and perhaps Norway) should also specialize in agriculture! Note also that Austria, which should
not, according to this view, specialize in agriculture, has a relatively large agricultural labor force.
15For completeness, Figure 5.6 shows the sectoral labor productivities of the three small sectors.
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have been systematically larger than that in France.
We now turn the focus to the structuralist interpretation of the data. Let us reca-
pitulate that story. First, there are some sectors that are intrinsically more productive than
others. Second, there are labor-market distortions that prevent the flow of resources to the
more productive sectors, with the result that even in equilibrium one observes diﬀerences in
value-added per worker. Third, these imperfections notwithstanding, resources do gradually
flow toward the more productive sectors, leading to catch up by the countries whose industrial
structure was initially most distorted.
As a first step to evaluating this view, we plot, for each country, the levels of sec-
toral labor productivity relative to agricultural productivity. These plots are displayed in
Figure 5.7. It is clear from this figure that, for all countries, and throughout all the period,
agriculture is the least productive sector. The (weak) exceptions are the UK before 1975,
for which the productivity levels of the three sectors are very close, the Netherlands before
1970, and Sweden between 1975 and 1990, for which the productivity gap of services over
agriculture is nil. To the extent that poorer countries experience flows of labor away from
agriculture larger than the Northerners, these productivity gaps should be a source of overall
productivity convergence. As we saw above, this has indeed been the case: Greece, Portugal,
Spain, Ireland, and Italy have experienced substantial declines in their shares of agriculture
relative to France, whereas the Northerners, having started out with relatively small shares
of agriculture, experienced a relative increase in agricultural shares (always with respect to
France).
While the inter-sectoral productivity gaps are generally large, there are few clear
general trends in their behavior over time. In several countries the gap between the high
productivity (services and manufacturing) and low productivity (agriculture) sectors has been
slowly closing over the period. This is the case for Greece, Spain, Italy, Germany, Denmark,
Sweden, Finland, and our reference country, France. However, in all these cases, the inter-
sectoral productivity gaps remain well above 50 percent. For Portugal, the productivity gap
in favor of manufacturing declines until 1980, stabilizes during the eighties, and then shoots
up decisively, together with the productivity advantage of the services sector, which shows no
trend in the earlier period. In the UK, the Netherlands, and Norway we see a sizeable increase
in the productivity premium of manufacturing starting in the mid seventies. Ireland shows
a similar pattern, although the increase starts in 1980. Austria exhibits significant increases
in the productivity advantage of both services and manufacturing relative to agriculture in
the sixties. Belgium’s experience is an attenuated and more gradual version of Austria’s.
For the sake of completeness Figure 5.8 shows the labor productivity of the remaining
(small) sectors relative to agriculture. Again there are no uniform trends across countries.
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What strikes the eye is that the utilities sector is substantially more productive than the two
other sectors and agriculture, although this is neither too surprising (given that the utility
sector is not labor-intensive), nor too relevant (as utilities account on average for less than
2 percent of the labor force). Far below utilities, the next sector in this B-league ranking is
transportation and the third and last is construction (although in some countries–such as
Greece– and some sporadic years, the ranking between these two is reverted).16
This discussion so far suggests the following tentative conclusion. Initially poorer
Western European countries converged to France because: i) The productivity of the sectors
in which they specialized converged to the productivity of the same sectors in France - this
is the within industry productivity convergence documented in Figure 5.5; ii) They moved a
larger share of their workforce towards the higher productivity sectors — this is the pattern
of convergence in sectoral composition of the labor force documented in Figure 5.3; and iii)
(For some of these countries) there was a generalized convergence of the productivity of the
sectors in which they had a disproportionate share of the labor force to the productivity of
the sectors in which France was specialized — when and where this inter-sectoral productivity
convergence occurred can be seen in Figure 5.7. We now turn to a quantitative assessment
of these three channels.
5.1 Convergence Decomposition: Analytics
Let us call yijt the per worker value added in country i, sector j, at time t. Denote by a
i
jt the
share of employment in country i, sector j, at time t. Total value added per worker in country
i at time t, yit, can then be expressed as the weighted sum of sectoral labor productivities,
yit =
JX
j=1
aijty
i
jt. (2)
16As we mentioned, new trade theories not grounded on comparative advantage are harder to diﬀerentiate
from the structural-transformation view in that they do not necessarily predict that integration leads to struc-
tural divergence. We observe, however, that if trade-induced scale economies had been an important source
of catch-up for the Southerners we should see their tradable sectors (agriculture and/or manufacturing) sys-
tematicaly outpace their non-tradable sectors (services, utilities, construction, and electricity) in productivity
gains. It is hard to discern any such systematic pattern in Figures 5.7 and 5.8.
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As always, we use France, i = F, as the numeraire for our convergence analysis. We thus
measure overall productivity convergence to France by the quantity17
∆
yit − yFt
yFt
=
yit − yFt
yFt
− y
i
t−1 − yFt−1
yFt−1
.
This measure of convergence is convenient because it can be exactly decomposed into the
three channels mentioned in our previous discussion: i) within-industry convergence, ii) con-
vergence due to labor reallocation, and iii) inter-sectoral, or between-industry convergence.
To see this, add and subtract the term
JP
j=1
aijty
F
jt to equation (2):
yit =
JX
j=1
aijt(y
i
jt − yFjt) +
JX
j=1
aijty
F
jt
Then:
yit − yFt =
JX
j=1
aijt(y
i
jt − yFjt) +
JX
j=1
(aijt − aFjt)yFjt
yit − yFt
yFt
=
JX
j=1
aijt
Ã
yijt − yFjt
yFt
!
+
JX
j=1
(aijt − aFjt)
yFjt
yFt
.
Taking first diﬀerences, and grouping terms conveniently, we obtain:
∆
yit − yFt
yFt
=
JX
j=1
a¯ijt∆
Ã
yijt − yFjt
yFt
!
+ (3)
+
JX
j=1
Ã
yijt
yFt
!
∆aijt −
JX
j=1
Ã
yFjt
yFt
!
∆aFjt
+
JX
j=1
³
a¯ijt − a¯Fjt
´
∆
Ã
yFjt
yFt
!
where ∆xjt = xjt − xjt−1 and x¯ijt =
xijt+x
i
jt−1
2 .
In the Tables that follow, we call “Total convergence” the quantity on the left hand
side in equation (3). “Within-industry convergence” is the quantity on the first line of the
right hand side; this captures the productivity catch-up of each sector with the corresponding
one in France, weighted by the average labor share in that sector. “Labor reallocation” is
17Note that the two expressions we study in our convergence decomposition exercises are, to a first-order
approximation, equivalent; that is,
yit−y
F
t
yFt
≈ ln yit−ln yFt . To see this notice that log-linearizing
yit−y
F
t
yFt
=
yit
yFt
−1
around
yit
yFt
= 1 leads to ln
yit
yFt
(= ln yit − ln yFt ). Or, alternatively,
yit−y
F
t
yFt
can be seen as the first-order Taylor
approximation of ln
yit
yFt
around
yit
yFt
= 1.
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the quantity in the second line, which quantifies the part of convergence due to inter-sectoral
workforce movements, appropriately weighted by the relative productivity of the sector. In
particular, in the special case where there are no within-industry labor productivity gaps
(yijt = y
F
jt), labor reallocation contributes to convergence if and only if country i transfers
a larger share of the labor force than France towards the high productivity industries. If
there are within-industry productivity gaps this eﬀect may be attenuated. Specifically, if
sector j in France is much more productive than in country i, labor reallocation may lead
to divergence even if France is moving fewer workers towards this sector. Finally, “Between-
industry convergence” is the quantity in the third line, and measures the contribution to
convergence of inter-sectoral productivity convergence. In particular, if the productivity of
the sectors in which a country had a disproportionate share of the labor force converges to
the overall productivity of France we will see convergence.
We perform this decomposition for the whole period, 1960 through 2000, for which
sectoral data are available in all countries (except for Ireland, whose data starts in 1970).
The results are summarized in Table 5.1. Panel A shows the convergence decomposition in
absolute terms. The first column shows the total productivity convergence to France from
1960 through 2000 (for Ireland, we report the figures for 1970-2000). These are the same
numbers underlying the plots in Figure 2.1, and the first column of Table 4.1, to a first-order
approximation (
yit−yFt
yFt
≈ ln yit − ln yFt as noted before). As we already know, five countries
experienced substantial convergence from below: Ireland, Spain, Portugal, Austria, Italy, and
Greece. The other countries converged from above or remained at roughly the same level as
France.
The three following columns in Panel A show the quantitative magnitudes of the three
sources of convergence. The corresponding columns in Panel B show the contribution of each
source as a percent of total convergence. These numbers are illustrated in Figure 5.9, which
shows graphically the contribution to convergence of the diﬀerent components. Interestingly,
the true Southerners –Greece, Italy, Spain, and Portugal– achieved convergence mainly by
reallocation of the labor force from low to high-productivity sectors (at a faster rate than
France, as always). Labor reallocation accounts for about 60 percent of total convergence in
Spain and Portugal, 100 percent in Italy and more than 100 percent in Greece (other elements
played against convergence in this country). Hence, for the true Southerners, we find a lot
of support for what we called the “structuralist” view of convergence. Labor reallocation is
also quite important for the convergence of France to the UK, as it accounts for about 50
percent of it (an important part of the story here is that agricultural shares declined much
more slowly in the UK than in France).
Austria and Ireland, instead, converged mainly through within-industry productivity
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catch-up. The within-industry mechanism is also behind the convergence of the Northerners,
accounting in all cases for more than 60 percent of the total convergence. Within—industry
productivity convergence is not well accounted for by either the trade view, or the structural-
transformation view. Rather, it has probably more to do with the capital deepening and
technology catch-up processes highlighted in the previous section.
Given the qualitative evidence from Figure 5.7 it is not surprising that the third
component of the sectoral decomposition of convergence, between-industry productivity con-
vergence, is never the most important factor. Indeed, in most cases it is the least important
source of convergence - and in some cases it even operates in the direction of divergence.
Nevertheless, in the case of Greece, inter-sectoral productivity convergence has been fairly
important. In particular, Greece benefited from the productivity gains of agriculture, given
its large share in this sector. Portugal and Spain also gained some ground thanks to this
between-industry catch up, although the quantitative contribution of this source has not been
as substantial.
Before concluding and summarizing this section we take a brief look at the role of
sectoral developments in shaping convergence dynamics in diﬀerent sub-periods. Hence, we
decompose each of the terms in (3) into the two sub-periods 1960 through 1975 (60-75) and
1975 through 2000 (75-00). We now introduce sub-indices to indicate the period to which
the diﬀerence operator ∆ applies. So, within-industry convergence 1960-2000 is decomposed
as:
Within− industry
convergence
=
JX
j=1
a¯ij00∆60−00
Ã
yij00 − yFj00
yF00
!
=
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j=1
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i
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2 .
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Similarly, labor reallocation is decomposed as
Labor reallocation
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Finally, between-industry convergence is decomposed by sub-periods as:
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Table 5.2 looks at the within-industry convergence in the two sub-periods 1960 through
1975, and 1975 through 2000. As mentioned before, Austria and Ireland converged mainly
through within-industry catch up. However, in the case of Austria, this catching-up took
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place very early: more than 90 percent of the within-industry productivity gain took place
in the first sub-period, whereas in the case of Ireland, more than 90 percent of the catch up
took place in the second sub-period. As for the Northerners, typically more than two thirds
of the within-industry convergence took place in the first sub-period. The only exception is
Germany, which exhibits significant convergence in the second sub-period, clearly due to the
addition to Eastern Germany. An interesting case is Greece, which lost significant ground
in terms of within-industry productivity in the second period. This source of divergence is
behind the reversal in relative overall productivity noted in Figure 2.1.
Table 5.3 shows the part of the convergence due to labor reallocation in each of the
sub-periods. About 50 percent of the labor-reallocation induced convergence experienced by
the Southerners took place in the first 15 years. This fraction is even larger for Greece in
this sub-period (65 percent), so that we can conclude that Greece converged through labor
reallocation in the 1960s and early 1970s, and subsequently diverged by losing within-industry
relative productivity. For the Northerners, more than 50 percent of the convergence due to
labor reallocation appears to take place in the first sub-period, except for Norway for which
the contribution of the early period’s reallocation was 20 percent. All in all, then, these 15
years witness substantial convergence induced by labor reallocation. As discussed early on,
this is primarily driven by the relatively faster decline in agricultural shares experienced by
the deep Southerners. Recall that Austria, in contrast to the deep Southerners, started with
relatively low shares of agriculture, and hence there was little action on this margin. Ireland
started out with somewhat higher agricultural shares than Austria, but still well below the
corresponding ones in the true Southerners.
For completeness Table 5.4 shows the between-industry catch up in the two sub-
periods. We do not linger on this table as we saw in Table 5.1 that this mechanism did not
play a prominent role for most countries.
Summing up to here, the deep Southerners — Greece, Portugal, Spain, and Italy —
converged mainly through labor reallocation, with about half of it taking place during 1960-
1975. In the case of Greece this eﬀect was counterbalanced in 1975 by significant losses in
within-industry productivity. The other (real or honorary) Southerners, Austria and Ireland,
converged mainly through within-industry productivity gains, most of which occurred in
the first 15 years for Austria, and in the second sub-period for Ireland. France converged
to the Northerners mainly through the within-industry channel, although in the UK labor
reallocation also played an important role.
Our tentative overall conclusion on the Western European convergence experience,
therefore, is as follows. First, at least by the admittedly coarse standards we have applied,
sectoral specialization according to comparative advantage has not been a critical source of
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catching up by the initially poorer countries. Instead, disproportionately large labor reallo-
cation towards more productive sectors has contributed substantially to the convergence of
Portugal, Spain, Greece, and Italy towards average Western European levels of labor produc-
tivity. Second, we also see substantial within-industry labor productivity convergence, and
this was especially important in the catching up of Austria and Ireland. This within industry
labor productivity convergence is probably best understood in the light of the substantial
relative gains in physical capital per worker and total factor productivity by poorer coun-
tries documented in the previous section. Instead, it is probably not linked to human-capital
deepening.18
6 The Easterners
Enough with latitude: let’s turn to longitude. As mentioned in the Introduction, labor
productivity relative to France in Eastern Europe is roughly where it was in Southern Europe
before the South staged its catch up. Given what we have learned about some of the mechanics
of this catch up, we can try to speculate about the Easterners’ prospects. In particular, we
can ask two sets of questions. The first set of questions is based on the analysis of Section
4. How much do gaps in physical capital per worker, human capital, and TFP account for
the overall productivity gap of the Easterners relative to France? How do these three gaps
compare to the corresponding gaps prevailing in Southern Europe in 1960? The second set
of questions is linked to the analysis in Section 5. How does the industrial structure of the
Easterners diﬀer from France’s? How do these diﬀerences compare to the corresponding
diﬀerences in Southern Europe before the catch up?
We begin, however, by briefly reviewing the aggregate picture. Figure 6.1 plots current
levels of labor productivity relative to France in 13 “Eastern-European” countries: the ten
admitted into the EU in May 2004, plus Bulgaria, Romania, and Turkey, three candidates.
For comparison, we also plot the corresponding relative productivities in the five Southerners
in 1960. (For these aggregate GDP comparisons we could have plotted the 1950 values for
the Southerners, but - for reasons already discussed above — the earliest available date for the
disaggregated comparisons we present later is typically 1960. Hence, we chose to write this
section with that date as a benchmark). To keep up with the geographic theme, these relative
productivities are plotted in increasing order of longitude. As before, these productivity data
18Needless to say, intersectoral reallocation of labor also contributes to overall capital deepening and TFP
gains, if labor flows towards more capital intensive and eﬃcient sectors. It would indeed be very interesting
to be able to decompose the capital and TFP convergence of the previous section into a within-industry
relative capital deepening and TFP growth component and a component linked to sectoral reallocation. At
the moment we do not have the data to do this.
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come from PWT.
The Easterners are very unproductive relative to France. In fact, their real produc-
tivity gap with France is on average substantially larger than the Southerners’ productivity
gap in 1960. The exceptions are Malta (which is where Austria was then), Cyprus (between
Spain and Austria), Slovenia (similar to Spain in 1960), and Hungary, the Czech Republic,
and Slovakia (at about Portugal’s level back then). Some of the other countries are far below
these levels, and indeed considerably poorer (in relative terms) than the Southerners were
even in 1950. Romania’s relative productivity, 15 percent, is especially low.
What are the source of these large productivity gaps? One way to answer this question
is presented in Figure 6.2, where we show physical capital gaps, i.e., levels of physical capital
per worker relative to France (first panel); human capital gaps; (second panel); and TFP
gaps (third panel). The physical capital stocks and TFPs of the Easterners are constructed
in the same way as the corresponding variables for Western European countries in Section 4.
Unfortunately, we only have long time series on real investment rates for 5 of the Easterners,
which explains the thinner data clouds in the first and third panels. The human capital stocks
are also constructed as in Section 4, except that we now must use the Barro and Lee (2001)
data as the De La Fuente and Domenech (2002) data set does not cover these countries.
Relative capital stocks and relative TFPs are plotted against relative labor productivities.
The solid line in each graph is the 45 degree line.
Once again the most striking feature of this decomposition seems to pertain to human
capital: most of the Easterners have current levels of human capital above France. Only
Slovenia, Malta, and Turkey have fewer average years of schooling than France, and only the
last one substantially so. Hence, one conclusion is that among the Easterners, Turkey is the
only one whose productivity gap with France is partially explained by a human-capital gap.
This was not generally true for the Southerners in 1960: Portugal, Greece, Spain, and Italy
all had significantly lower human capital than France. Since human capital gaps seem to be
very persistent (see Section 4), this may be viewed as very good news for the Easterners: the
handicap that is toughest to overcome is the one they do not have.
For the countries with available long investment series, physical capital gaps are
large. Indeed, by checking relative physical capital levels against the 45 degree line, we
can see that in most cases physical capital gaps are even larger (though not by much) than
real productivity gaps. The same was true in 1960 of Portugal, Greece, and Spain. Not
surprisingly, for the same countries we also see TFP gaps that are large, but not as large
as the labor productivity gaps. The Southerners had smaller TFP gaps, even controlling for
the level of relative income (this makes up for their lower relative human capital). In sum,
it would appear that for the Easterners to converge what is required is a combination of
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capital deepening faster than in the West, and technological catch up. This is exactly what
the Southerners did. However, the Southerners’ initial disadvantage was not as large, so it
may be presumed that the Easterner’s convergence will take somewhat longer.
One way to see if the Easterners look on the path of catching up in physical capital
levels is to look at investment shares of GDP. This is done in the fourth panel of Figure 6.2,
which is also an indirect way of extending the assessment of the physical capital position
of a larger number of Eastern European countries. Judging from the position of relative
investment vis-a-vis the 45 degree line, in 1960 the Southerners had investment shares relative
to France somewhat higher than their labor productivities relative to France. The same seems
to be broadly true today of the Easterners. This is reassuring.
We now turn to industrial structure. The discussion that follows is based on the
data reported in Table 6.1, or in its graphical equivalent, Figure 6.3, which plots against
total productivity (i) the diﬀerence in sectoral shares (resh) of each country with respect to
France, (ii) the relative sectoral productivity (rely) of each country with respect to France,
and (iii) the relative productivity of manufacturing and services vis-a-vis agriculture for each
country (secty). Table 6.1 begins by reporting diﬀerences in employment shares of the three
main sectors vis-a-vis France — in 1960 for the Southerners and in 2000 for the Easterners.
Once again, sectoral data construction is described in the appendix.
There is significant variance in the relative shares of agriculture both within the
Southerners and within the Easterners. Romania and Turkey exhibit the highest agricultural
share relative to France. The agricultural share in Romania is 40 percentage points higher
than in France, in Turkey 30 percentage points. Their closest parallel in 1960 is Greece, with
roughly a 35 percentage points diﬀerence over France. Poland and Bulgaria are closer to
Spain, with diﬀerence in shares vis-a`-vis France of about 20 percentage points. Latvia and
Lithuania resemble Italy in 1960. If the historical experience of their Southern counterparts
is any guidance, therefore there seems to be a substantial margin for convergence through
labor reallocation for all these countries. In Hungary, Estonia, Slovak Republic, and Slovenia,
diﬀerences in labor shares in agriculture with respect to France are lower (somewhere between
the corresponding share diﬀerentials in Austria and Italy in 1960), while Malta, Cyprus, and
the Czech Republic have agricultural labor shares that are very close to those in France (as
was the case for Austria in 1960).
Labor shares in Manufacturing are larger than France’s for all Easterners, except
Cyprus, which exhibits approximately the same share as France. On these dimensions, then,
the situation is quite diﬀerent from the Southerners’ in 1960, where the manufacturing shares
were systematically below those in France (except for Austria, whose share was very close to
France’s).
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Services, broadly speaking, takes up the slack between these sectors. Romania,
Turkey, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovak Republic, and Bulgaria have services shares that
are well below the corresponding shares in France in 2000, and the diﬀerences are remark-
ably higher (in absolute terms) from those exhibited by the Southerners in 1960. Continuing
with the parallel between the two years, Hungary looks like Greece, Slovenia like Portugal,
Lithuania like Spain, and Estonia and Latvia like Italy.
Turning to sectoral productivity (fourth-to-seventh columns of Table 6.1, second row
of Figure 6.3), the Easterners in 1960 are on average significantly less productive vis-a`-vis
France than the Southerners were in 1960. In particular, with three exceptions, agricultural
productivity relative to France is lower for all Easterners than it was for Greece–the country
with lowest relative agricultural productivity in 1960. The exceptions are the Czech Republic,
whose relative agricultural productivity is comparable to that in Portugal in 1960, Cyprus,
with relative productivity comparable to Spain, and a big outlier, Malta, whose agricultural
productivity is well above France’s in 2000.
There are also big contrasts in manufacturing productivity. Easterners’ productivity
is remarkably lower than that in France, and the productivity gap is again higher than that
exhibited by the Southerners in 1960. Ten out of the thirteen Easterners show productivity
levels well below 50 percent of France’s. The relative productivities for these ten countries
range from 19 percent in Romania to 43 percent in Hungary. In 1960, even Greece, the least
productive country in manufacturing, was in a better position, with a productivity equal to
53 percent of France’s. This is quite remarkable, given that — as we just mentioned — the
industrial production of the Easterners is tilted towards manufacturing. The productivity
gaps for Slovenia, Cyprus, and Malta find some counterparts in the Southerners in 1960.
Slovenia’s relative productivity is similar to that of Portugal. Cyprus’s relative productivity
falls between Spain and Italy, and Malta’s compares to Italy’s.
A similar picture emerges in services. With the three small exceptions–Cyprus,
Malta, and Slovenia– the Easterners’ productivity in services is much lower than France’s,
and productivity gaps are larger than those shown by the Southerners in 1960. Labor produc-
tivity relative to France’s ranges from 32 to 57 percent for the Easterners–without counting
the three exceptions–whereas the lowest value for the Southerners in 1960 was 70 percent
(in Portugal). Slovenia’s relative productivity (77 percent) falls in between those of Portugal
and Austria, while Cyprus’s and Malta’s productivities fall between the corresponding ones
in Austria and Spain
The last two columns of Table 6.1 (and last row of Figure 6.3) take up inter-sectoral
productivity diﬀerentials. For the Southerners in 1960 manufacturing was between 2 to 3
times more productive than agriculture. the corresponding range for services was about 2
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to 5. In the East we find more variation. At one extreme, Malta’s agriculture is (slightly)
more productive than the other sectors. At the other, Polish manufacturing is 8 times more
productive than agriculture, and services 10 times! Romania also has an extraordinarily un-
productive agriculture, vis-a-vis the other sectors. On balance, and weighted by population,
we can conclude that inter-sectoral productivity diﬀerential in the east are at least as large
as they were in the South in 1960.
In sum, there are some broad qualitative similarities between the Easterners to day
and the Southerners in 1960. First, both groups have large shares of their workforce in their
least productive sectors. Poland’s large share of agriculture illustrates this massive failure
of comparative advantage particularly strikingly. But Malta and Estonia also look like their
manufacturing shares are too big.19 Second, there is a component of the productivity gap
that is not due to sectoral structure but to within industry productivity diﬀerentials. We
now briefly turn to a quantitative assessment of these similarities.
Simple algebra along the lines of the previous section allows to write
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The left hand side is the aggregate productivity gap between France and country i, as a
percentage of country i’s income. The right hand side decomposes this gap into three com-
ponents. The first term is the “within industry” component. Holding constant country i’s
sectoral employment shares, it answers the question of by how much would country i’s income
increase if its sectoral labor productivities converged to the productivities of the correspond-
ing sectors in France. The second term is the “between industry component.” Holding
constant country i’s sectoral labor productivities, it asks by how much would country i’s
output per worker increase if its employment shares were the same as France’s. The third
component is a “covariance” term.
The results of this decomposition are reported in Table 6.2. The first column is the
productivity gap on the left hand side of equation (4), while columns 2 to 4 report the three
pieces on the right hand side. The top panel, reserved to the Southerners in 1960, shows
that broadly speaking within-industry productivity gaps and sectoral composition were both
important determinant of the productivity gaps of these countries. The between component
was larger than the within component for Italy and Greece, while the within component
dominated for Austria, Spain, and Portugal.
The bottom panel reports decomposition results for the Easterners. Consistent with
19This failure of comparative advantage has been noted more broadly. For example, developing countries
have huge employment shares of agriculture, and much lower relative labor productivity in this sector than in
the rest of the economy [e.g. Gollin, Parente, and Rogerson (2001)].
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our previous discussion, we find enormous within-industry productivity diﬀerences. For some
of the poorest countries within-industry productivity convergence (holding constant employ-
ment shares) would lead to a four-fold increase in aggregate labor productivity. Also, as
expected, the within-industry component of the income gap with France is much larger than
it was true for the Southerners in 1960.
What is new and somewhat unexpected in Table 6.2 is the relatively limited role
of the between-industry component. Despite their large employment shares in the relatively
unproductive industries, for 8 out of the 18 Eastern European countries the income gap due to
the structure of employment is less than 10 percent (i.e. moving to French employment shares
holding constant labor productivities would increase output by less than 10 percent). As a
result, the between component explains a relatively modest fraction of the overall productivity
gap with France. In comparison, except for Austria, the Southerners had substantially larger
between components, both in absolute terms and as a percent of the overall income gap.
The smaller role of the between component is particularly evident if one compares South and
North at similar levels of the income gap with France.
Nevertheless, for some of the largest and poorest countries, labor reallocation towards
the more productive sectors would make a substantial diﬀerence. In the case of Poland it
would raise income by 27 percent — hardly enough to bridge the gap with France, but certainly
important in absolute terms. Similarly, attaining French sectoral employment shares would
increase income per worker by 32 percent in Turkey, 19 percent in Bulgaria, and 68 percent
in Romania.
To summarize, then, we could say the following. In the South structural imbalances
towards the low productivity sectors were important determinants of their initial income gaps
vis-a-vis France, and a big part of their convergence experience is associated with the reallo-
cation of resources towards greater value added industries. These structural distortions are
also present today in the East. Indeed, some of the poorest and largest countries can indeed
look forward to meaningful labor productivity gains form inter-sectoral labor reallocation.
However, and in contrast to the story in the South, these potential gains constitute a rela-
tively small share of their overall income gap. Hence, to the extent that productivity gains
through structural reshuﬄing are a relatively low hanging fruit, one comes away from this
evidence somewhat less bullish about the prospects of fast convergence by the Easterners.
Nevertheless, the news is not all bad. The South also had sizable within-industry
productivity gaps — as well as between-industry ones — and was able to bridge most of these
gaps through physical capital accumulation and TFP growth. One can only presume that
the East will be able to replicate this experience. Furthermore, whatever gaps remain in the
South are due to a failure to catching up in human capital. If anything, then, the Easterners
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should do even better in the long run, as they face no permanent handicap arising from human
capital diﬀerentials. But the fact that the within-industry gaps are much larger, coupled with
having to rely exclusively on the “within” margin (and not also on the “between” margin),
suggests that the long run may take a long time to arrive.
7 Conclusions
In 1950 the average Spanish worker generated goods and services worth little more than 60
percent of the goods and services generated by the average French worker. By 1970 the ratio
was 90 percent. How did this happen? The data suggests that a critical mechanism for Spain’s
explosive catching up has been a vast redeployment of labor out of agriculture and towards
higher value-added sectors. This redeployment was going on in France as well, but because
Spain started out with a much larger agricultural sector, it benefited disproportionately.
The sectors receiving these labor flows are presumably more productive because they are
characterized by higher capital intensity and higher total factor productivity. Consistent
with this conjecture, we see Spain’s overall capital-labor ratio and TFP catching up strongly
with France’s. However, a secondary but not trivial part of Spain’s convergence to France is
also attributable to catching-up of labor productivity within sectors: for example, Spanish
manufacturing was 60% as productive as French manufacturing in 1960, but by 1970 this
ratio had increased to 87%. Hence, presumably, not all of the overall convergence in physical
capital and TFP is linked to the structural transformation: some of it is driving relative
productivity trends within industries. Despite substantial convergence in sectoral structure,
physical capital per worker, and TFP, since the mid-1970s Spanish average labor productivity
has hovered at around 90 percent of French average labor productivity. Our data indicate
that this persistent remaining gap is mostly due to an equally persistent gap in human capital
per worker.
In 2000 the average Polish worker generated goods and services worth 41 percent
of those produced by the average French worker. Various elements contribute to this low
productivity. As was true for Spain then, a substantially larger fraction of workers in Poland
is employed in agriculture. The diﬀerence between the labor shares of Poland and France
is above 22 percentage points. As was true for Spain then, this disproportionate share of
agriculture flies in the face of economic eﬃciency. The average worker in agriculture produces
less than 9 percent of what his counterpart does in France, while the relative productivities of
manufacturing and services are, respectively 40 and 56 percent. There is therefore substantial
scope for eﬃcient labor reallocation in the country. However, these numbers also imply that,
as — once again — was true for Spain in 1960, there is also a big margin for within-industry
productivity catch up. Indeed, quantitatively, the case of Poland is quite diﬀerent from the
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case of Spain, as most of the aggregate productivity gap with France is attributable to these
within-industry productivity gaps. Hence, for Poland the road to convergence passes through
physical-capital deepening and TFP gains at the industry level. This means that convergence
may take quite a bit longer. On the other hand, unlike Spain, Poland could actually look
forward to a complete catch up, as it is not hobbled by a human capital handicap.
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APPENDIX ON SECTORAL DATA
Data on PPP-adjusted real GDP per worker and total employment come from the
Penn World Tables 6.1. Real GDP per worker is the variable RGDPWOK and total em-
ployment is computed using real GDP per capita (RGDPCH), real GDP per worker, and
population (POP) as:
Total employment =
RGDPCH ∗ POP
RGDPWOK
Shares of sectoral GDP and sectoral employment were computed from the Organiza-
tion for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)’s “STAN Database for Industrial
Analysis,” Volume 2004, release 03. This database reports the value-added at basic prices
(named VALU) and employment (EMPN) by sector (ISIC Rev. 3) from 1970 to 2000. The
countries covered (and used in our analysis) are: Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Repub-
lic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Netherlands, New Zealand,
Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, and United Kingdom. There are,
however missing values for some country/years, which we completed using the OECD’s “Na-
tional Accounts of OECD Countries” (Detailed Tables, Volume II, 1970-2001). The variables
used are Valu-B (value-added at basic prices), and ETOP (number of persons employed).20
Both STAN and National Accounts are available online through SourceOECD.
For data on sectoral value added in the period 1950 through 1970, and for missing
values in SourceOECD during 1970 through 2000, we use sectoral value-added from various
printed editions of the OECD’s “National Accounts of OECD Countries” (Volume II). In
particular, for 1950-1965, we use Table 3 of the 1950-1969 Volume. For 1970-1980, we use
Table 12 of the 1970-1982 Volume. For 1985-1990 we use Table 12 of the 1983-1995 Volume,
and for 1995 we use Table 7 of the 1989-2000 Volume. (Note that, while available in the books,
the information is not always provided by the electronic version of “National Accounts of
OECD Countries.”)21 For Portugal, “Construction” and “Manufacturing” are aggregated in
20Data for Turkey are available from this source.
21There are some diﬀerences in the classification across books, for which we performed the appropriate
adjustments. In particular, in the first volume, some countries do not separate between “Mining and Quar-
rying” and “Manufacturing.” We created an additional industry (Mining and Quarrying and Manufacturing)
with these aggregated data. For countries that do report separately “Mining and Quarrying” and “Man-
ufacturing,” the aggregate industry is the sum of the two. An analogous rationale is behind the sectors
Public administration, education, and health services, which are aggregated under Community Services. To
match the categories between the first two periods in the books and the latter ones, we match “Banking etc.”
with “Finance etc.” “Owenrship of dwellings” is always aggregated with “Finance, etc.” in the latter issues.
Hence we aggregate them through the whole sample. “Public administration” is matched with “Producers of
Government Services.” “Health and Education” is matched with “Community, Social, and Personal Services.”
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1955; we split them by applying the corresponding shares obtained from Bank of Portugal’s
“Se´ries Longas para a Economia Portuguesa po´s II Guerra Mundial,” available online at
http://www.bportugal.pt/.
For sectoral employment information missing in SourceOECD during 1970 through
2000, we use employment data from the International Labor Oﬃce (ILO)’s “LABORSTA
Labour Statistics Database,” available on line at http://laborsta.ilo.org/. For the period 1950
through 1970, we use data from “ILO Yearbook of Labor Statistics - Retrospective Edition -
Population Censuses,” along with three editions (1961, 1966, and 1972) of the Book “ILO
Yearbook of Labor Statistics.” The general strategy is to use overlapping years across diﬀerent
volumes to construct a consistent series. In the case of Italy, for 1965 we split some sectors
that were aggregated using the corresponding shares of 1966. Still, labor share data were
missing for some country-years. We completed them using Table 1, page 20*, of the “Annuaire
Statistique de la France 1972,” edited by the Institut National de la Statisque et des Etudes
Economiques (INSEE). From this report, we used data for France and the United Kingdom
(taking the figures in 1954 in lieu of 1955, which were missing; we also took the averages
between 1958 and 1962 in lieu of 1960, and 1964 in lieu of 1965). We used these data also
for Italy and Spain, in combination with the ILO’s Yearbook of Labor Statistics data (for
1955 we used 1954; for 60 we used the average of 1958 and 1962). Finally, we filled in data
for Spain in 1965 using data from the book “Poblacio´n, Actividad y Ocupacio´n en Espan˜a:
Reconstruccio´n de la series histo´ricas: 1960-1978.”
Given that part of the data are based on ISIC. Rev. 1, ISIC Rev. 2 and part are based
on ISIC Rev 3., we converted the data into a maximum common denominator. The resulting
sectors are 1) Agriculture, Fishing, Forestry and Hunting; 2) Manufacturing, Mining and
Quarrying; 3) Construction; 4) Transport, Storage, and Communications; 5) Electricity, Gas,
and Water; and 5) Services (including Trade, Restaurants and Hotels, Finance, Insurance,
Real State and Business Services, and Community, Social, and Personal Services).
For a group of Easterners, SourceOECD has complete data in 2000. This group
includes Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, and Turkey. For the remaining East-
erners, we took the sectoral shares of GDP and employment from the 2002 regular reports by
the European Economic Commission on each country’s progress towards accession. Hence,
data for Bulgaria, Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovenia and Malta come
from this source.
Sectoral value added and sectoral employment are obtained by applying the sectoral
shares to total real GDP and employment from the Penn World Tables.
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Figure 2.1: GDP per Worker Relative to France
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Figure 2.2: Relative GDP and Year of EC Membership
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Figure 4.1: Capital Intensity and TFP Relative to France
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Figure 4.2. Contribution of Physical/Human Capital and TFP to Convergence
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Capital TFP Country Total
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Human 
Capital TFP
Greece 0.24 0.10 0.01 0.12 Greece 0.39 0.21 -0.03 0.21 Greece -0.15 -0.10 0.04 -0.09
Portugal 0.37 0.18 -0.04 0.23 Portugal 0.12 0.03 -0.03 0.12 Portugal 0.25 0.15 0.00 0.11
Spain 0.29 0.14 0.00 0.14 Spain 0.39 0.16 -0.06 0.29 Spain -0.10 -0.01 0.06 -0.15
Italy 0.17 0.00 0.02 0.15 Italy 0.08 0.01 -0.02 0.09 Italy 0.10 -0.01 0.04 0.07
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Human 
Capital TFP
Greece 0.24 0.00 0.03 0.21 Greece 0.39 0.09 -0.02 0.32 Greece -0.15 -0.09 0.05 -0.11
Portugal 0.37 0.18 -0.05 0.24 Portugal 0.12 0.04 -0.04 0.12 Portugal 0.25 0.14 -0.01 0.12
Spain 0.29 0.24 -0.02 0.07 Spain 0.39 0.22 -0.07 0.24 Spain -0.10 0.03 0.05 -0.17
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United Kingdom -0.24 -0.05 -0.05 -0.14 United Kingdom -0.29 -0.04 -0.04 -0.20 United Kingdom 0.05 -0.01 -0.01 0.07
Netherlands -0.30 -0.07 -0.01 -0.22 Netherlands -0.16 -0.01 -0.02 -0.13 Netherlands -0.14 -0.06 0.01 -0.09
Ireland 0.61 0.10 -0.04 0.55 Ireland -0.03 -0.05 -0.05 0.07 Ireland 0.64 0.15 0.01 0.48
Denmark -0.25 -0.11 -0.16 0.01 Denmark -0.27 -0.07 -0.07 -0.13 Denmark 0.02 -0.03 -0.09 0.14
Sweden -0.33 -0.18 -0.01 -0.14 Sweden -0.20 -0.11 -0.03 -0.06 Sweden -0.13 -0.08 0.02 -0.08
Norway -0.05 -0.01 -0.14 0.09 Norway -0.19 -0.06 -0.07 -0.06 Norway 0.13 0.05 -0.07 0.16
Finland 0.09 0.02 0.04 0.03 Finland -0.03 0.02 0.01 -0.06 Finland 0.12 0.00 0.03 0.09
Table 4.5. Convergence Decomposition with Country
Specific Capital Shares, 1960-1975
Table 4.6. Convergence Decomposition with Country
Specific Capital Shares, 1975-2000
Table 4.1. Convergence Decomposition 1960-2000 Table 4.2. Convergence Decomposition 1960-1975 Table 4.3. Convergence Decomposition 1975-2000
Table 4.4. Convergence Decomposition with Country
Specific Capital Shares, 1960-2000
Figure 5.1: Sectoral Employment Shares, Large Sectors
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Figure 5.2: Sectoral Employment Shares, Small Sectors
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Figure 5.3: Sectoral Employment Diff. with France, Large Sectors
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Figure 5.4: Sectoral Employment Diff. with France, Small Sectors
 
Greece 
 Construction  Transportation
 Electricity
1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
-.2
-.1
0
.1
.2
.3
 
Portugal 
 Construction  Transportation
 Electricity
1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
-.2
-.1
0
.1
.2
.3
 
Spain  
 Construction  Transportation
 Electricity
1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
-.2
-.1
0
.1
.2
.3
 
Italy  
 Construction  Transportation
 Electricity
1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
-.2
-.1
0
.1
.2
.3
 
Austria 
 Construction  Transportation
 Electricity
1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
-.2
-.1
0
.1
.2
.3
 
Germany 
 Construction  Transportation
 Electricity
1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
-.2
-.1
0
.1
.2
.3
 
Belgium 
 Construction  Transportation
 Electricity
1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
-.2
-.1
0
.1
.2
.3
 
United Kigdom 
 Construction  Transportation
 Electricity
1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
-.2
-.1
0
.1
.2
.3
 
Netherlands 
 Construction  Transportation
 Electricity
1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
-.2
-.1
0
.1
.2
.3
 
Ireland 
 Construction  Transportation
 Electricity
1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
-.2
-.1
0
.1
.2
.3
 
Denmark 
 Construction  Transportation
 Electricity
1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
-.2
-.1
0
.1
.2
.3
 
Sweden 
 Construction  Transportation
 Electricity
1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
-.2
-.1
0
.1
.2
.3
 
Norway 
 Construction  Transportation
 Electricity
1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
-.2
-.1
0
.1
.2
.3
 
Finland 
 Construction  Transportation
 Electricity
1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
-.2
-.1
0
.1
.2
.3
gure 5.5: Sectoral GDP per Worker Relative to France, Large Secto
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gure 5.6: Sectoral GDP per Worker Relative to France, Small Secto
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Figure 5.7: GDP per Worker Relative to Agriculture, Large Sectors
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igure 5.8: GDP per Worker Relative to Agriculture, Small Sector
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Fig 5.9. Contribution of Within/Between-Industry and Labor Reallocation to Convergence
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Panel A. Sources of Convergence
Country Total Within Industry
Labor 
Reallocation
Between 
Industry
Austria 0.18574 0.19021 -0.01690 0.01243
Belgium 0.03656 0.07528 -0.01508 -0.02364
Denmark -0.29550 -0.29159 0.00174 -0.00566
Finland 0.08694 -0.01294 0.07648 0.02339
Germany -0.18532 -0.17639 0.01365 -0.02259
Greece 0.15108 -0.14367 0.22265 0.07211
Irelanda 0.66513 0.64484 0.00509 0.01519
Italy 0.17588 -0.01138 0.17731 0.00994
Netherlands -0.37501 -0.23461 -0.12447 -0.01593
Norway -0.05943 0.06120 -0.12580 0.00517
Portugal 0.22085 0.04858 0.13063 0.04164
Spain 0.22670 0.05847 0.14043 0.02780
Sweden -0.35827 -0.36782 0.02396 -0.01440
United Kingdom -0.24639 -0.09833 -0.11848 -0.02958
Panel B. Relative Contribution of Different Sources
Country Total Within Industry
Labor 
Reallocation
Between 
Industry
Austria 100.00% 102.41% -9.10% 6.69%
Belgium 100.00% 205.91% -41.24% -64.67%
Denmark 100.00% 98.68% -0.59% 1.91%
Finland 100.00% -14.88% 87.98% 26.90%
Germany 100.00% 95.18% -7.37% 12.19%
Greece 100.00% -95.09% 147.37% 47.73%
Irelanda 100.00% 96.95% 0.77% 2.28%
Italy 100.00% -6.47% 100.81% 5.65%
Netherlands 100.00% 62.56% 33.19% 4.25%
Norway 100.00% -102.98% 211.68% -8.70%
Portugal 100.00% 22.00% 59.15% 18.85%
Spain 100.00% 25.79% 61.95% 12.26%
Sweden 100.00% 102.67% -6.69% 4.02%
United Kingdom 100.00% 39.91% 48.09% 12.00%
a The values for Ireland correspond to 1970-2000.
Table 5.1. Convergence Decomposition 1960-2000
 
 
Country 1960-2000 1960-1975 1975-2000
Austriaa 0.19021 0.17845 0.01176
Belgium 0.07528 -0.01176 0.08704
Denmark -0.29159 -0.33765 0.04606
Finland -0.01294 -0.11098 0.09804
Germany -0.17639 -0.06089 -0.11550
Greecea -0.14367 0.06531 -0.20898
Irelandb 0.64484 0.03368 0.61117
Italy -0.01138 -0.04220 0.03083
Netherlands -0.23461 -0.15446 -0.08015
Norway 0.06120 -0.20269 0.26389
Portugal 0.04858 0.00786 0.04071
Spain 0.05847 0.20573 -0.14727
Sweden -0.36782 -0.26671 -0.10111
United Kingdom -0.09833 -0.24155 0.14322
Panel B. Contribution of each subperiod to Within-Industry Convergence
Country 1960-2000 1960-1975 1975-2000
Austriaa 100.00% 93.82% 6.18%
Belgium 100.00% -15.62% 115.62%
Denmark 100.00% 115.80% -15.80%
Finland 100.00% 857.81% -757.81%
Germany 100.00% 34.52% 65.48%
Greecea 100.00% -45.46% 145.46%
Irelandb 100.00% 5.22% 94.78%
Italy 100.00% 370.99% -270.99%
Netherlands 100.00% 65.84% 34.16%
Norway 100.00% -331.18% 431.18%
Portugal 100.00% 16.19% 83.81%
Spain 100.00% 351.88% -251.88%
Sweden 100.00% 72.51% 27.49%
United Kingdom 100.00% 245.66% -145.66%
Table 5.2. Within-Industry Convergence. 1960-1975 and 1975-2000.
Panel A. Within-Industry Convergence, by sub-period
a Values for Austria and Greece correspond to the subperiods 1960-1980 and 
1980-2000. b Values for Ireland correspond to the subperiods 1970-1975 and 
1975-2000.
 
Country 1960-2000 1960-1975 1975-2000
Austriaa -0.01690 -0.04635 0.0294519
Belgium -0.01508 -0.01534 0.00026
Denmark 0.00174 -0.01001 0.01175
Finland 0.07648 0.06019 0.01629
Germany 0.01365 0.00791 0.00574
Greecea 0.22265 0.14552 0.07713
Irelandb 0.00509 0.00882 -0.00373
Italy 0.17731 0.08253 0.09478
Netherlands -0.12447 -0.07747 -0.04700
Norway -0.12580 -0.02582 -0.09999
Portugal 0.13063 0.06996 0.06067
Spain 0.14043 0.07103 0.06941
Sweden 0.02396 0.01126 0.01269
United Kingdom -0.11848 -0.06430 -0.05418
Panel B. Contribution of each subperiod to Labor Reallocation
Country 1960-2000 1960-1975 1975-2000
Austriaa 100.00% 101.71% -1.71%
Belgium 100.00% 101.71% -1.71%
Denmark 100.00% -573.88% 673.87%
Finland 100.00% 78.70% 21.30%
Germany 100.00% 57.93% 42.07%
Greecea 100.00% 65.36% 34.64%
Irelandb 100.00% 173.15% -73.14%
Italy 100.00% 46.55% 53.45%
Netherlands 100.00% 62.24% 37.76%
Norway 100.00% 20.52% 79.48%
Portugal 100.00% 53.55% 46.45%
Spain 100.00% 50.58% 49.42%
Sweden 100.00% 47.01% 52.99%
United Kingdom 100.00% 54.27% 45.73%
Table 5.3. Labor Realllocation. 1960-1975 and 1975-2000
Panel A. Labor Reallocation Convergence, by sub-period
a Values for Austria and Greece correspond to the subperiods 1960-1980 and 
1980-2000. b Values for Ireland correspond to the subperiods 1970-1975 and 
1975-2000.
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Figure 6.2: Capital Intensity and TFP Relative to France
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Table 6.1. The Southerners in 1960 and the Easterners in 2000
Agriculture Manufacturing Services Agriculture Manufacturing Services Manufacturing Services
Spain 1960 0.207 -0.046 -0.144 0.854 0.597 1.036 2.099 2.863
Italy 1960 0.113 -0.017 -0.089 0.940 0.715 1.321 2.283 3.315
Austria 1960 0.017 0.028 -0.060 0.948 0.812 0.803 2.572 1.998
Greece 1960 0.344 -0.144 -0.155 0.565 0.529 1.130 2.815 4.719
Portugal 1960 0.268 -0.091 -0.135 0.571 0.567 0.690 2.977 2.848
Malta 2000 -0.025 0.105 -0.022 1.983 0.829 1.016 0.750 0.779
Estonia 2000 0.028 0.112 -0.091 0.472 0.252 0.400 0.959 1.287
Czech Republic 2000 0.013 0.152 -0.240 0.599 0.392 0.559 1.174 1.420
Cyprus 2000 0.012 -0.015 0.031 0.852 0.644 0.869 1.356 1.551
Hungary 2000 0.024 0.092 -0.160 0.521 0.435 0.556 1.499 1.621
Slovak Republic 2000 0.050 0.098 -0.216 0.379 0.384 0.549 1.821 2.203
Bulgaria 2000 0.225 0.075 -0.213 0.194 0.208 0.320 1.926 2.510
Latvia 2000 0.102 0.052 -0.087 0.150 0.219 0.344 2.628 3.494
Slovenia 2000 0.054 0.167 -0.147 0.359 0.562 0.769 2.810 3.257
Lithuania 2000 0.142 0.059 -0.132 0.184 0.294 0.322 2.868 2.663
Turkey 2000 0.303 0.026 -0.265 0.189 0.331 0.453 3.150 3.647
Romania 2000 0.410 0.065 -0.384 0.072 0.190 0.327 4.728 6.899
Poland 2000 0.220 0.042 -0.263 0.087 0.404 0.568 8.368 9.973
Sectoral Productivity                
Relative to France
Sectoral Productivity Relative 
to Agricultural ProductivityCountry Year
Difference in Employment Shares 
Relative to France
 
Figure 6.3: Sectoral Data for the Easterners
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Table 6.2. Sectoral Sources of Income Gaps
Country Year Total Gap Within Between Covariance
Italy 1960 0.08 0.00 0.12 -0.04
Austria 1960 0.19 0.18 0.00 0.00
Spain 1960 0.49 0.28 0.19 0.02
Greece 1960 0.77 0.33 0.42 0.02
Portugal 1960 1.03 0.65 0.26 0.12
Malta 2000 0.06 0.09 0.02 -0.05
Cyprus 2000 0.24 0.23 0.02 0.01
Slovenia 2000 0.48 0.51 0.07 -0.10
Hunagary 2000 0.93 0.98 0.01 -0.06
Czech Rep. 2000 1.02 1.08 0.04 -0.10
Slovakia 2000 1.08 1.09 0.06 -0.06
Poland 2000 1.43 1.30 0.27 -0.14
Estonia 2000 1.85 1.88 0.04 -0.07
Turkey 2000 2.23 1.91 0.32 0.00
Latvia 2000 2.51 2.42 0.10 -0.01
Lithuania 2000 2.52 2.39 0.09 0.03
Bulgaria 2000 3.13 2.89 0.19 0.05
Romania 2000 4.79 4.09 0.68 0.03
Figure A.1: Two Measures of Years of Schooling
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